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Abstract
Is public support for redistribution affected by the number of people experiencing
economic strain in a country? This question is investigated by comparing twenty-eight countries
in the fourth round of the European Social Survey 2008–09 using two-level linear regression
models. The results show that individuals reporting economic strain support redistribution
more strongly than those who do not experience economic strain. Further, individuals living in
countries where many other people report economic strain also support redistribution more
strongly than individuals living in countries with less economic strain. The latter correlation
is not explained by objective measures of the economic situation such as household income
or the income dispersal of the country. The country-level effect of economic strain holds
for all income levels. It is largely driven by a tendency to strongly believe in redistribution
when living in countries of widespread economic strain. The results indicate that governments
would receive more rather than less public support for redistributive policies during periods of
economic strain.
Introduction
Most countries have some institutional arrangements for transferring income
or wealth from rich to poor individuals or families. The most important
arrangements are controlled by governments, including taxation of wealthier
individuals and social expenditures benefiting poorer individuals and families.
These policies are the subject of considerable political controversy, however, as
they reflect two conflicting principles: that people should be allowed to live
according to prevailing social standards (Marshall, 1964) versus that they should
do what they can to be economically self-sufficient (Feldman and Zaller, 1992).
Knowing in what kind of situations the public wants more redistribution is
important because with no public demand policy makers are unlikely to enter
the controversial issue of economic redistribution.
Much empirical research has investigated what kind of individuals tend to
support or not support economic redistribution (Taylor-Gooby, 1985), or in what
kind of countries public opinion is more or less supportive toward redistribution
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(Svallfors, 1997). This paper introduces economic strain as a new explanation of
public support toward redistribution. I hypothesise that economic strain affects
public preferences for redistribution at the level of both individuals and countries.
The individual-level effect means that individuals reporting economic strain are
more likely to support redistribution than those not reporting economic strain.
The country-level effect means that as more people experience economic strain
in a country, even individuals not reporting economic strain tend to support
redistribution.
Compared to conventional explanations, economic strain is first of all an
alternative to studying the effects of the economic situation of individuals and
countries using objective economic measures such as household income and
the income dispersal of the country (i.e. the Gini coefficient). I argue that
economic strain is a theoretically simpler explanation of why people support
redistribution than most objective measures of economic well-being. Empirically,
I will show it is also a stronger predictor of public support toward redistribution
than conventional economic explanations.
These effects are investigated in twenty-eight countries in the fourth round of
the European Social Survey (ESS) 2008–09 using multi-level (random intercept)
linear regression models. The analysis also investigates how far income levels
and the income dispersal of the country can help explain why economic
strain is associated with preferences for redistribution. I first present a review
of conventional explanations of public support toward redistribution, before
presenting the new perspective on how economic strain might affect public
preferences for redistribution of income.
Individual-level characteristics
Who tends to support redistribution of income from rich to poor individuals?
Much empirical research has investigated individual characteristics seen as
indicators of the self-interest individuals have in relation to economic
redistribution (Sears et al., 1980; Hasenfeld and Rafferty, 1989). The self-interest
argument claims that those who are likely to gain from redistribution are more
likely to support it, whereas those who are likely to contribute to the redistribution
to others are more likely to oppose such policies. Empirical findings are consistent
with this argument. For example, economically vulnerable individuals, as defined
by low income and ethnic minority status (Hasenfeld and Rafferty, 1989) or by
low occupational class and non-employment (Svallfors, 1997; Edlund, 1999), are
more likely to support welfare provision associated with redistribution than less
vulnerable groups. This is also the case when comparing public attitudes toward
welfare policies in several countries (Svallfors, 1997; Edlund, 1999; Blekesaune
and Quadagno, 2003).
use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047279412000748
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Open University Library, on 20 Jan 2017 at 01:56:39, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
economic strain and public support for redistribution 59
Correlations between income and support for redistribution are not very
strong, however. Consequently, there is some debate over how far individual
self-interest can explain variation in support for redistribution. One alternative
explanation is that people may support redistribution if economic strain is
supposedly caused by circumstances beyond individual control (Fong, 2001).
This hypothesis is supported by psychological research finding a strong link
between attributions of personal responsibility for people’s economic situation
and support for redistribution (Appelbaum, 2001; Mitchell et al., 2003).
Country-level characteristics
Research has also investigated how far individuals living in different countries
hold different preferences for economic redistribution (Svallfors, 1997; Dallinger,
2010) or social expenditure (Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003). In these studies,
country-level characteristics are often investigated as institutional characteristics
of welfare policies (Svallfors, 1997; Larsen, 2008) or as economic factors typically
related to economic cycles (Blekesaune, 2007; Dallinger, 2010) or the income
dispersal of the country (Lu¨bcker, 2007; Finseraas, 2009).
The institutional argument claims that institutional characteristics of welfare
programmes shape public opinion (Svallfors, 1997; Larsen, 2008). Most research
has investigated institutional characteristics rather crudely by grouping countries
into a few types of welfare regimes (Svallfors, 1997; Edlund, 1999) a` la Esping-
Andersen (1990). More recent research has also utilised more direct policy
measures, including social expenditures (Jæger, 2006; Jakobsen, 2010) or more
continuous scales measuring welfare regimes (Jæger, 2009). Comparative findings
on welfare opinions only partially support the hypothesised consistency between
public opinion and welfare policies (Jæger, 2009; Dallinger, 2010). Continuous
variables could perhaps prove more promising than categorical classifications of
welfare regimes (Jæger, 2009; Jakobsen, 2010) but might also create a risk that the
large number of policy indicators made available by organisations such as Eurostat
and OECD make it possible to construct measures supporting any hypothesis.
Much of this research is based on strong theoretical assumptions: correlation
between welfare regimes and public opinion reflects that policies affect public
opinion, disregarding either the possibility that public opinion also affects welfare
policies or the presence of a third variable (e.g. historical experience) affecting
both policy makers and public opinion.
Economic factors
At least two types of economic factor have been investigated for how they
affect public attitudes toward redistribution. One is economic cycles, typically
measured as employment or unemployment rates (Blekesaune, 2007; Kim,
2007); the other is income dispersal, typically measured by the Gini coefficient
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(Finseraas, 2009; Lupu and Pontusson, 2011). The economic cycle argument
was popular in the 1960s and 1970s when several authors claimed that public
support for leftist policies (Leggett, 1964) or welfare provision and redistribution
(Cutright, 1965; Wilensky, 1975) tends to rise in ‘bad’ periods of low employment
or high unemployment rates. More recent empirical research is consistent with
this argument, looking at temporal variation in employment rates (Blekesaune,
2007) or unemployment rates (Kim, 2007) in several countries.
The issue of income dispersal and public support for redistribution has
attracted interest over recent years. Theoretically, much research has made use
of the median voter theorem, stimulated by the Meltzer and Richard (1981)
model. When median income is lower than average income – the situation in
most countries – more income dispersal should lead to more public support for
redistribution, certainly among middle-income citizens (Lu¨bker, 2007; Finseraas,
2009). In democratic societies, it should also lead to more redistribution but this
is of less interest here; this analysis focuses on the first part of the model.
Empirical findings are not always consistent with this hypothesis. In
aggregate data analyses, Kenworthy and McCall (2008) do not find this income
dispersal effect when looking at trends in public support for redistribution
in eight countries. Nor does Lu¨bker (2007) find an income dispersal effect
when comparing public support for redistribution in twenty-six countries in
the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) data. The latter study finds that
public support for redistribution is correlated with popular assessments of the
income dispersal of their country as being too large or not too small. Finseraas
(2009) finds, on the other hand, a positive correlation between income dispersal
and public support for redistribution in the first round of the European Social
Survey (ESS). Also, Lupu and Pontusson (2011) find a correlation between income
dispersal and public support for redistribution among middle-income citizens
(r= 0.45) when comparing ninety country-level observations from various (ISSP
and ESS) surveys.
Economic strain
The current analysis uses economic strain in place of other economic factors
for predicting preferences for redistribution. Economic strain is measured
subjectively, reflecting the extent to which people find it hard to live on their
current income (Whelan et al., 2001; Berthoud et al., 2009). The terminology
used in analyses of economic strain is not very consistent. Existing research
uses all combinations of financial/economic and strain/stress/hardship. Various
measures of economic strain are also used. Some authors use single items,
typically indicated by living comfortably versus finding it hard to live on current
income (Whelan et al., 2001); others use indices that may include additional items
(Berthoud and Bryan, 2011).
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I hypothesise that economic strain makes individuals more supportive
toward redistribution for two reasons: (1) such policies would improve their
economic situation, and (2) individuals experiencing economic strain are more
aware of economic problems than those not having such problems. Further,
individuals living in countries where many people experience economic strain are
also more likely to support redistribution, for similar reasons: (1) high incidence
of economic strain makes individuals aware of the risk of economic strain,
including those currently not experiencing such problems, and (2) this situation
makes people aware of the problems of economic strain since there are more
individuals around them experiencing such problems. At the country level, there
is also a third reason: (3) when more people experience economic strain, public
opinion is more likely to see economic strain as an outcome of factors beyond
individual control. In these situations, people tend to be more supportive toward
redistribution, as indicated by empirical research (Appelbaum, 2001; Fong, 2001;
Mitchell et al., 2003) and normative theory (Rawls, 1972).
Research on public opinion toward redistribution has largely investigated
economic factors by objective characteristics (i.e. household income and income
dispersal), and not as subjective assessments such as economic strain. Theoretical
arguments, however, seemingly assume that low-income or high degree of
income dispersal measured objectively affects people’s preferences for economic
redistribution via some changes in people’s subjective assessment of their
economic situation or the situation of their country. This follows from a standard
self-interest or rational choice model (Elster, 1989; Lu¨bker, 2007). Economic
strain can be seen as a more direct measure of how people assess their economic
situation, and would relate more directly to the underlying theoretical model
compared to objective income measures.
Economic strain does not necessarily correspond to situations of low income
or where people are excluded from enjoying prevailing standards of living.
Whelan and colleagues (2001) find that income, standards of living and subjective
assessment – including economic strain – are not highly correlated. The research
literature provides various arguments in favour of investigating some but not
all of these factors. For example, people experiencing low income over short
periods of a few years do not necessarily experience economic strain or reduce
their standards of living (Berthoud and Bryan, 2011). Ringen (1988) argues that
low standards of living, and low assessments of these standards, are more direct
measures of poverty than (current) income.
Somewhat contrarily, economic strain does not only reflect low income but
is also affected by how ambitious people are regarding consumption and abilities
to convert income to goods and services. For example, older people tend to do
better on low income than younger adults (Berthoud et al., 2009), and rising
income levels in a society (economic growth) are not necessarily associated with
less economic strain (Berthoud and Bryan, 2011).
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For these reasons, economic strain is controversial when used as an indicator
of poverty. Social philosophers have argued that society should not support
ambitious individuals with expensive tastes at the expense of others whose tastes
are more modest (Rawls, 1972; Sen, 1992). The political implications might be
different, however. For example, historians have argued that economic strain,
rather than low income, fuelled the revolutions of Russia and Cuba (Carr, 1953;
Zeitlin, 1966). Income poverty may not lead to demand for more redistribution
or welfare provision, whereas economic strain might.
Method
The data analysed in this paper are from the fourth round of the European Social
Survey 2008–09. All twenty-eight countries are investigated: Belgium, Bulgaria,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great
Britain, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Israel, Latvia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey and Ukraine. Sample sizes vary from 1,159 (Cyprus) to 2,673 (Germany),
with a mean of 1,898.
The dependent variable, preferences for redistribution, is measured by a
single item: ‘Using this card, please say to what extent you agree or disagree with
each of the following statements [starting with]: The government should take
measures to reduce differences in income levels.’ The card has five responses
varying from ‘Agree strongly’ [value 5] to ‘Disagree strongly’ [value 1] plus ‘Don’t
know’ [set to missing].
The main explanatory variable, economic strain, is also measured by a single
item: ‘Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to how you feel about
your household’s income nowadays?’ The card has five responses varying from
‘Living comfortably on present income’ [value 1] to ‘Finding it very difficult on
present income’ [value 4] plus ‘Don’t know’ [set to missing].
The data are investigated using linear regression models with random
intercepts for the twenty-eight countries. The statistical analysis controls for
gender (female dummy), age, being partnered (married or cohabiting dummy)
or not and the number of children living in the household. Age is controlled
for by three linear slopes (splines), and is divided by ten in order to make the
coefficients larger in the tables, with the result that decimals reflect individual
years. It is centred on forty years (values in parentheses): fifteen to forty years
(−2.5–0), forty to sixty years (0–2), and sixty to ninety-nine years (0–3.9). All
regression analyses are non-weighted.
Sensitivity analysis is carried out by reclassifying the dependent variable: first,
by making it symmetrical, next by identifying two groups supporting economic
redistribution (strongly or any kind of support) using binary logit models, and
finally by limiting the analysis to the lower seven income deciles or the mid four
income deciles, to test the median voter hypothesis.
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A further analysis investigates how far the (individual- and country-level)
effects of economic strain on public support for redistribution are explained
by the income level of the household and the country (using mean household
income of the country). Household income is measured by ten income levels pre-
classified in the survey questionnaire corresponding broadly to the deciles of the
actual household income range of each country. This income variable is after tax
income from all sources. Respondents can provide the answer in terms of weekly,
monthly or annual income. Unfortunately, the household income variable is only
available for twenty-five of the twenty-eight countries (not Bulgaria, Cyprus or
Slovakia), and only 81 per cent of the respondents of these twenty-five countries
answer this question (lower in Southern Europe, only 42 per cent in Portugal),
corresponding to 73 per cent of the full sample.
A final analysis investigates whether the income dispersal of the country
can help explain the correlation between economic strain and support for
redistribution. Income dispersal is measured by the Gini coefficient taken from
Eurostat’s EU-SILC database from 2008 (2009 for some countries). Unfortunately,
these data include only twenty-three of the twenty-eight countries investigated
(not Cyprus, Israel, Russia, Turkey or Ukraine). When combining household
income and Gini coefficients in the same analysis, the number of countries drops
to twenty-one and the number of individuals drops to 31,450 (59 per cent of the
full sample).
Descriptive statistics (Table 1) show that a majority of the respondents
support redistribution, with a mean of 3.9 along the 1–5 scale. A minority report
economic strain, with a (weighted) mean of 2.3 along the 1–4 scale. In the first
analyses (Table 2), this variable is centred on its arithmetic (non-weighted) mean
of 2.2, varying from −1.2 to 1.8 between respondents, and somewhat less between
countries (−0.8–0.9), because of a cross-level interaction term of economic strain
at the levels of individuals and countries.
Respondents are evenly distributed over the ten income deciles, with slightly
fewer on the lowest two income levels (mean 5.3). The number of children in
the household is delimited to four because of the small number of households
with more than four children. Fifty-three per cent of the respondents are women
and 62 per cent are partnered (using weighted data). Mean economic strain and
mean household income of the countries, at the lower end of the table, are simple
(non-adjusted, non-weighted) mean values calculated for each country in the
sample.
Results
Regression results are presented in Table 2. Model 1 shows that individuals
reporting economic strain are more likely to support redistribution than
individuals not reporting economic strain. The predicted support for
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TABLE 1. Descriptive statistics of the variables (European Social Survey
2008/2009 using design and population weights
Variables Countries Respondents Mean S.D. Low High
Individual level
Redistribution 28 53,133 3.9 1.0 1 5
Economic strain 28 53,133 2.3 0.9 1 4
Econ. str.-centred 28 53,133 0.0 0.9 −1 2
Female (d) 28 53,133 53.4% 0 1
Age 28 53,133 45.5 18.1 15 99
Partnered (d) 28 53,133 61.7% 0 1
Children 28 53,133 0.7 1.0 0 4
Income decile 25 38,770 5.3 2.8 1 10
Country level
Mean (econ. strain) 28 53,133 2.3 0.5 1.4 3.1
Econ. str.-centred 28 53,133 0.1 0.5 −0.8 0.9
Mean (income) 25 38,770 5.0 0.8 3.4 7.5
Gini coefficient 23 43,233 30.7 3.1 23.4 37.7
Note: (d) = dummy variable, coded 1 and 0.
TABLE 2. Two-level linear regression analysis of public support for
redistributiona as a result of individual-level (53,133) characteristics and mean
economic strain of the country (28) (coefficients with standard errors in
parentheses)
(1) (2) (3)
Individual level
Female (1, 0) 0.098∗∗ (0.008) 0.098∗∗ (0.008) 0.055∗∗ (0.006)
Age (15–40)/10 0.006 (0.009) 0.006 (0.009) 0.025∗∗ (0.007)
Age (40–60)/10 0.094∗∗ (0.008) 0.096∗∗ (0.008) 0.064∗∗ (0.006)
Age (60–99)/10 –0.020∗ (0.009) –0.019∗ (0.009) –0.022∗∗ (0.006)
Partnered (1, 0) –0.017 (0.010) –0.015 (0.010) –0.010 (0.007)
Children (1–4) 0.002 (0.005) 0.002 (0.005) –0.002 (0.004)
Economic strainb 0.187∗∗ (0.005) 0.190∗∗ (0.005) 0.138∗∗ (0.004)
Country level
Mean (econ. strain)a 0.236∗ (0.088) 0.234∗ (0.086) 0.187∗∗ (0.060)
Cross level:
Interaction (econ. str.) –0.064∗∗ (0.012) –0.036∗∗ (0.009)
Constant 3.782∗∗ (0.043) 3.793∗∗ (0.043) 3.989∗∗ (0.030)
S.D. countries 0.216 (0.029) 0.211 (0.029) 0.146 (0.020)
S.D. individuals 0.961 (0.003) 0.961 (0.003) 0.717 (0.022)
Rho (ICC) 0.048 (0.012) 0.046 (0.012) 0.040 (0.010)
Log likelihood –73354 –73339 –57673
Notes: ∗ significant at 5 per cent and ∗∗ significant at 1 per cent in two-sided tests,
a 1–5 in models 1 and 2, 3–5 in model 3, b 1–4 variable minus (mean of) 2.2. Age centred at
40 years.
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Figure 1. Combinations of individual and country-level economic strain in support for
redistribution
Note: Predictions from model 2, Table 2.
redistribution (1–5) increases with an average of 0.187 for each unit increase
in economic strain (roughly from −1 to 2). Further, individuals living in
countries where many people report economic strain are also more likely to
support redistribution than individuals living in countries where few people
report economic strain. This is also the case when controlling for economic
strain of the household. The predicted support for redistribution (1–5) increases
with an average of 0.236 for each country-level mean increase in economic
strain. Economic strain does vary more between individuals (or household)
than between countries; standard deviation (S.D.) statistics are twice as large
when comparing individuals (S.D. = 0.91) as they are in country comparisons
(S.D. = 0.46) (not shown in tables). Still, an increase in the mean economic
strain of the country affects people’s preferences for redistribution as much or
even more than a similar increase in economic strain of the household.
Model 2 includes a cross-level interaction term between economic strain
at the levels of individuals and countries. Figure 1 presents predictions for four
combinations of this result as indicated by low and high economic strain at the
levels of individuals and countries. The predictions are calculated at plus/minus
1.2 standard deviations (of the empirical distribution) of the two centred
variables (from Table 1): plus/minus 1.09 (0.91∗1.2) at the level of individuals
and plus/minus 0.56 (0.46∗1.2) at the level of countries.1 The graph shows that
in countries of widespread economic strain, both individuals experiencing and
not experiencing economic strain tend to support redistribution. In countries of
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less economic strain, only those experiencing economic strain tend to support
redistribution.
Further results show that women are more supportive of redistribution than
men, and people in their sixties are more supportive than those below forty.
There are no differences between partnered and non-partnered individuals, or
between those with and those without children in the household.
The lower part of Tables 2 and 3 splits the unexplained variation between
individuals and countries. By comparing statistical models with and without
various explanatory variables, it can be shown that only economic strain explains
country-level variation in public support for redistribution; standard deviation
statistics (S.D.) are reduced from 0.292 in a model with no explanatory variables
to 0.211 in a model including only economic strain (not shown in tables).
Further, the mean economic strain of the country explains more country-
level variation in public support for redistribution (down to 0.211) than the
individual (compositional) effect in economic strain (down to 0.237) (not shown
in tables). Taken together, both regression slopes and random variation indicate
that economic strain at country level is important in shaping public attitudes
toward redistribution, and it appears to be important for understanding country-
level variation in public support for redistribution.
Sensitivity
It is a potential problem with these cross-level interaction effects that they could
result from a so-called ceiling effect. The dependent variable varies from 1 to 5
with a mean of nearly 4, meaning that very few people are against redistribution.
Hence, the low variation in public support for redistribution in countries of
widespread economic strain could simply reflect that the instrument measuring
this support does not pick up much variation in public support for redistribution
in poor countries. Model 3 (in Table 2) corrects for this potential bias by merging
the three lowest values in public support for redistribution (1–3) into a single
value (3), meaning that the dependent variable is symmetrical (similar numbers
of 3 and 5). This model provides results nearly identical to those of model 2 when
considering the smaller variation in the dependent variable (public support for
redistribution) in model 3 compared to that in model 2. Hence, we can conclude
that in countries where many people feel poor, even those who do not feel
poor tend to support redistribution from rich to poor individuals. In wealthier
countries, redistribution is subject to more controversy when comparing rich
and poor individuals.
The ESS questionnaire identifies two groups supporting redistribution of
income: those agreeing strongly with redistribution and those reporting any
kind of agreement with redistribution. The two outcomes can be investigated
separately using binary logit models. Such analyses show largely similar results
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as those reported in Table 2 (results not shown in tables). The individual-
level effect of economic strain is slightly stronger in the model of any kind
of agreement with redistribution than when analysing those agreeing strongly
with redistribution. The country-level effect of economic strain is, on the other
hand, much stronger when analysing those agreeing strongly than when analysing
those merely agreeing with redistribution, when this effect becomes marginally
non-significant. The interaction effect between economic strain at the levels of
individuals and countries is of similar magnitude in the two logit models.
The median voter theorem suggests that the results presented here should
hold for people with low and medium income but perhaps not for people with
higher incomes. This hypothesis can be investigated by restricting the analysis to
mid- and low-income earners. Results remain similar, however, for the economic
strain variables when restricting the analyses to the lower seven income deciles
or to the mid four income deciles (analysis not shown here). The sole exception
is that the individual-level (but not country-level) effect of economic strain is
reduced slightly when omitting the highest two income deciles. Hence, these
results cannot be interpreted into a simple rational choice model where support
for redistribution occurs only where this is gainful to the individual respondent.
Adding household income and income dispersal
Table 3 investigates similar correlations (to Table 2) by including household
income and country-level (mean household) income (model 1) or country-level
income dispersal measured by the Gini coefficient (model 2) as explanatory
variables. Since these analyses include fewer individuals (model 1 and 2) and
countries (model 2), the correlations between economic strain and support for
redistribution may also change (increase) as compared to the results in Table 2.
With no statistical control for economic strain, household income (1−10)
predicts support for redistribution (1–5) which decreases with an average of 0.057
for each unit (decile) increase in income (not shown in tables). The similar
(mean household) country-level income variable is similarly correlated (0.050)
with public preferences for redistribution when disregarding the smaller variance
in the country-level compared to the household-level income variable. This
country-level correlation is far from statistically significant, however.
When using both income and economic strain in the same model (1), we
find that both household income and household-level economic strain strongly
predict public support for redistribution. The two effects are of similar magnitude
when considering the actual variation in the two explanatory variables or the test
statistics associated with the two slopes. Still, there is a considerable amount
of overlap (collinearity) between these effects; they are both lower than in
models where only one of these effects is specified. At the country level, there
is no correlation between (mean household) income and public support for
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TABLE 3. Two-level linear regression analysis of public support for
redistribution (1–5) as a result of individual-level characteristics and
(mean) income level, income dispersal (Gini coefficients) and
(mean) economic strain of the country (coefficients with standard
errors in parentheses)
(1) (2)
Individual level
Female (1, 0) 0.093∗∗ (0.010) 0.108∗∗ (0.011)
Age (15–40)/10 0.004 (0.011) –0.001 (0.012)
Age (40–60)/10 0.086∗∗ (0.010) 0.092∗∗ (0.011)
Age (60–99)/10 –0.036∗ (0.010) –0.053∗∗ (0.011)
Partnered (1, 0) 0.032∗∗ (0.012) 0.056∗∗ (0.013)
Children (1–4) 0.005 (0.006) 0.004 (0.007)
H.h. income decile –0.037∗∗ (0.002) –0.042∗∗ (0.003)
Economic strain (1–4) 0.131∗∗ (0.007) 0.148∗∗ (0.008)
Country level
Mean (h.h. income) 0.081 (0.056)
Gini coefficient –0.007 (0.016)
Mean (economic strain) 0.383∗∗ (0.116) 0.404∗ (0.158)
Constant 2.423∗∗ (0.491) 3.026∗∗ (0.355)
S.D. countries 0.212 (0.030) 0.224 (0.035)
S.D. individuals 0.957 (0.003) 0.963 (0.004)
Rho (ICC) 0.055 (0.013) 0.051 (0.015)
Log likelihood –53371 –43499
Individuals 38,770 43,233
Countries 25 21
Notes: ∗ significant at 5 per cent and ∗∗ significant at 1 per cent in two-sided tests;
† significant at 5 per cent in one-sided tests. Age centred at 40 years.
redistribution when also controlling for economic strain (the income coefficient
switches sign in model 1). The slope between country-level economic strain and
public support for redistribution gets even steeper (and more significant) when
also controlling for the (mean household) income of the country.
Model 2 is similar to model 1 but now the country-level mean household
income variable is replaced by country-level income dispersal measured by the
Gini coefficient. The number of countries is also smaller, now reduced to twenty-
one, and the number of respondents drops to a mere 59 per cent of the full
sample. The country-level Gini coefficient is correlated with public support for
redistribution (not shown in tables), but this relationship is not strong and it is
only statistically significant when using a one-sided test (which is appropriate in
this case).
When using both economic strain and the Gini coefficient in the same model
(2), there is no correlation between the Gini coefficient and public support for
redistribution when also controlling for (country-level) economic strain (the
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Gini coefficient switches sign in model 2). The slope between country-level
economic strain and public support for redistribution gets even steeper when also
controlling for the country’s income dispersal measured by the Gini coefficient.
Most other results are similar when comparing Tables 2 and 3. The main
exception is that partnered individuals are more supportive toward redistribution
than non-partnered individuals when also controlling for household income.
Summary and discussion
I have hypothesised that economic strain leads to stronger public support for
redistribution, both among people experiencing economic strain and among
people living in countries where many other people report economic strain. Data
from the twenty-eight countries of the European Social Survey round four are
consistent with this hypothesis. These results are robust across various income
levels and various classifications of the dependent variable. The country-level
effect is largely driven by a tendency to strongly agree with redistribution in
countries of widespread economic strain.
Survey data on public attitudes may reflect tendencies people have to select
certain response categories (response style) or to present themselves in ways
that do not represent their true attitudes (response set) (O’Neill, 1967). These
tendencies are likely to become more important when comparing data from
various countries because of different languages and cultures (Singh, 1995). There
is thus a possibility that single items are correlated because of how respondents
from different countries interpret their exact wordings. The wordings of the
response categories for economic strain and support for redistribution are
different, however, and the ordering of these categories in the questionnaire
is such that any tendency to choose the first or the last category would lead to
a negative correlation between economic strain and support for redistribution,
the opposite of what is found here.
The fact that individuals experiencing economic strain tend to support
redistribution could be seen as self-evident since many of them would gain from
such policies. This follows from a standard self-interest argument. It is more
interesting that people not experiencing economic strain also tend to support
redistribution from the rich to the poor when living in countries where many
other people experience economic strain. This country-level effect of economic
strain is as strong, or even stronger, than the individual/household-level effect
of economic strain when disregarding the larger individual-level variation in
the economic strain variable. This finding can be given various interpretations.
The risk of running into economic problems is larger when many people are
experiencing such problems. Further, the awareness of the problem of economic
strain is larger when many people experience economic problems in a country,
even among those without such problems. Finally, public opinion is more likely
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to see economic strain as an outcome of factors beyond individual control when
more people experience economic strain.
The link between economic strain and public support for redistribution is
likely to be important for policy makers. Popular theory suggests that people’s
preferences for redistributive policies are rooted in more general value systems
regarding the proper relationship between the individual and the state (Feldman
and Zaller, 1992). The path dependency thesis could indicate that any policy
change affecting economic distribution will generate more negative than positive
feedback from the electorate (Pierson, 2000). This research indicates that the
scope for redistributive policies is better in periods of economic strain than in
periods of economic growth when regarding public support.
Both low income and economic strain are important for understanding
who is supporting redistribution at the level of individuals and households.
People with low incomes are more likely to experience economic strain than
higher-income individuals and families. Hence, the two explanations, low income
and economic strain, overlap to some extent in explaining who is supporting
redistribution of income. These findings make sense if we assume that low
income leads to more economic strain and eventually to more support for
redistribution. At the level of individuals and households, it appears that
economic strain to some extent mediates the effect of low income in explaining
who is supporting redistribution, and to some extent explains individual-level
support for redistribution beyond what is explained by their current income.
At the country level, both mean household income and income dispersal
could perhaps help explain why some countries are more supportive toward
redistribution than other countries. But neither of these effects is strong, and
both disappear when controlling for mean economic strain of the country.
Clearly, this subjective measure of economic problems is much more important
for understanding country-level variation in public support for redistribution
than the mean (household) income of the country, or the income dispersal
of the country. At the level of countries, it is unlikely that economic strain
merely mediates the effects of objective economic conditions. It is more likely
that economic strain drives public demand for redistribution, apparently across
various levels of economic prosperity and income dispersal.
Economic strain is important for understanding why some countries are
more supportive toward redistribution than others. Previous research has
largely explained country-level variation in public support for redistribution
by institutional factors (e.g. welfare regimes) or economic factors measured
objectively (economic cycles, income dispersal). Economic strain has some
advantages regarding simplicity of explanation (compared to income dispersal),
simplicity of interpretation (compared to institutional arrangements) and
empirical support (compared to other economic factors). Still the relationship
between economic strain and other factors affecting public support for
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redistribution should be investigated more thoroughly. For example, future
research should include actual redistribution when investigating public
preferences for redistribution. It should also look into more dynamic
(longitudinal) aspects of the relationships between income, standards of living,
economic strain and public support for redistribution.
Note
1 This range indicates high and low values while still including a large proportion of the
sample. In a normally distributed variable, 77 per cent would be within and 23 per cent
would be outside (11.5 per cent below and 11.5 per cent above) this range.
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